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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-4377 
_____________ 
 
EMMANUEL MAHN, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
               Respondent 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A078-780-110) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. Andrew R. Arthur 
 
Argued: June 25, 2014 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES and 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
(Opinion Filed: September 17, 2014) 
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Wayne P. Sachs, Esq. [ARGUED] 
1518 Walnut Street, Suite 702 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 Attorney for Petitioner 
 
Charles S. Greene, III, Esq.  
Zoe J. Heller, Esq. 
Andrew B. Insenga, Esq. [ARGUED] 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044 
 Attorneys for Respondent 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Emmanuel Mahn petitions for review of his final order 
of removal and contends that his Pennsylvania conviction for 
reckless endangerment is not a crime involving moral 
turpitude (“CIMT”). Applying the categorical approach, we 
conclude that the least culpable conduct punishable under 
Pennsylvania’s reckless endangerment statute does not 
implicate moral turpitude. Therefore, we grant Mahn’s 
petition for review and vacate the BIA’s removal order. 
 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
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 Emmanuel Mahn is a citizen of Liberia. In 2000, he 
entered the United States as a refugee. Nearly five years later, 
he adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident.  
 
 In 2007, Mahn pled guilty in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Delaware County, Pennsylvania to theft by deception 
and forgery. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3922(a); 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4101(a).  
 
 The following year, Mahn pled guilty in the Court of 
Common Pleas to recklessly endangering another person. See 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2705. According to the affidavit of 
probable cause and Mahn’s testimony during his removal 
proceedings, Mahn had just picked his sister up from work. 
As he was driving out of the parking lot, he lost control of his 
car and crashed into the garage and laundry room of a house 
located across the street. Although no one was injured, 
Mahn’s car damaged the garage door and laundry room of the 
house.  
 
In December 2011, the Department of Homeland 
Security issued Mahn a Notice to Appear, charging that he 
was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having 
“been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not 
arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” AR 
409. This charge was based on: (1) Mahn’s convictions for 
forgery and theft by deception, which were later deemed to 
arise from the same criminal scheme, and (2) his conviction 
for reckless endangerment. Mahn filed a motion to terminate 
his removal proceedings, asserting that his reckless 
endangerment conviction did not qualify as a CIMT.  
The Immigration Judge denied Mahn’s motion to 
terminate. The IJ pointed out that this Court in Knapik v. 
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Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 90 (3d Cir. 2004), determined that 
reckless endangerment, in violation of New York Penal Law 
§ 120.25, qualifies as a CIMT. The IJ concluded that, 
“consistent with Knapik, reckless endangerment under the 
Pennsylvania statute in question is a crime involving moral 
turpitude.” AR 320. The IJ also held that Mahn’s convictions 
for forgery and theft by deception constituted CIMTs. 
Accordingly, the IJ ruled that Mahn was removable as 
charged. At a subsequent merits hearing, the IJ denied 
Mahn’s applications for relief and protection from removal, 
and the IJ ordered Mahn removed to Liberia.  
 
 Mahn appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”). On appeal, he argued that his reckless endangerment 
conviction was not a CIMT. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s ruling 
in an unpublished, non-precedential decision rendered by a 
single Board member. Relying on Knapik, the BIA held that 
Mahn’s reckless endangerment conviction constituted a 
CIMT because “the statute under which [he] was convicted 
defines recklessness as a conscious disregard of a substantial 
risk of such a nature that it amounts to a gross deviation from 
the standard of care of a reasonable person” and is “coupled 
with the requirement that the conduct place another person in 
danger of death or serious bodily injury.” AR 4. On these 
grounds, the BIA dismissed the appeal. Mahn subsequently 
filed this petition for review.  
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
 “Where, as here, the BIA issues a written decision on 
the merits, we review its decision and not the decision of the 
IJ.” Bautista v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 54, 57 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(citing Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 
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2010)). Typically, we review the BIA’s legal conclusions de 
novo subject to the principles of deference set forth in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). See Bautista, 744 F.3d at 58. 
While we do not defer to the “BIA’s parsing of the elements 
of the underlying crime,” we generally accord deference to 
“the BIA’s determination that a certain crime involves moral 
turpitude when that determination is reasonable.” Mehboob v. 
Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 272, 275-76 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 
Knapik, 384 F.3d at 88).  
 
 In this case, however, Chevron deference is 
inappropriate because we are asked to review an unpublished, 
non-precedential decision issued by a single BIA member. 
Following United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), 
“we accord Chevron deference only to agency action 
promulgated in the exercise of congressionally-delegated 
authority to make rules carrying the force of law.” De Leon-
Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27). Unpublished, single-member BIA 
decisions are not “promulgated” under the BIA’s authority to 
“make rules carrying the force of law.” Id. To the contrary, 
these “decisions have no precedential value, do not bind the 
BIA, and therefore do not carry the force of law except as to 
those parties for whom the opinion is rendered.” Id. at 350. 
Since Mead, several Courts of Appeals have declined to apply 
Chevron deference to unpublished, single-member BIA 
decisions. See, e.g., Arobelidze v. Holder, 653 F.3d 513, 520 
(7th Cir. 2011); Carpio v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1091, 1097-98 
(10th Cir. 2010); Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 859 (9th 
Cir. 2009); Quinchia v. Att’y Gen., 552 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th 
Cir. 2008); Rotimi v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55, 57-58 (2d Cir. 
2007). We join our sister circuits in concluding that 
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unpublished, single-member BIA decisions are not entitled to 
Chevron deference. At most, these decisions are persuasive 
authority. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
 The Department of Homeland Security charged Mahn 
as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). That 
provision sets forth that “[a]ny alien who at any time after 
admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral 
turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal 
misconduct . . . is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). It 
is undisputed that Mahn’s convictions for forgery and theft by 
deception constitute CIMTs arising from a single scheme of 
criminal misconduct and that these convictions arose from a 
distinct scheme from his reckless endangerment conviction. 
Thus, Mahn’s removability turns on whether his reckless 
endangerment conviction also is a CIMT. 
 
 While the Immigration and Nationality Act does not 
define the term “moral turpitude,” the BIA and this Circuit 
have defined morally turpitudinous conduct as “conduct that 
is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted 
rules of morality and the duties owed other persons, either 
individually or to society in general.” See Knapik, 384 F.3d at 
89. “[T]he hallmark of moral turpitude is a reprehensible act 
committed with an appreciable level of consciousness or 
deliberation.” Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 411, 414 (3d 
Cir. 2005). Furthermore, it “is the nature of the act itself and 
not the statutory prohibition of it which renders a crime one 
of moral turpitude.” Totimeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 109, 114 
(3d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).  
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 We apply the categorical approach to assess whether a 
conviction qualifies as a CIMT. See Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 
582 F.3d 462, 465-66 (3d Cir. 2009). Under the categorical 
approach, we “compare the elements of the statute forming 
the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the elements of 
the ‘generic’ crime—i.e., the offense as commonly 
understood.” Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 
2281 (2013). In particular, “we look to the elements of the 
statutory offense to ascertain the least culpable conduct 
hypothetically necessary to sustain a conviction under the 
statute.” See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471 (citing Partyka, 417 
F.3d at 411). The “possibility of conviction for non-
turpitudinous conduct, however remote, is sufficient to avoid 
removal.” Id. 
 
 Mahn’s statute of conviction provides that “[a] person 
commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly 
engages in conduct which places or may place another person 
in danger of death or serious bodily injury.”1 18 Pa. Cons. 
                                              
1The mental state of “recklessness” is virtually identical under 
the New York statute at issue in Knapik and under 
Pennsylvania law. In New York, “[a] person acts recklessly . . 
. when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk” that is “of such nature and degree that 
disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in 
the situation.” N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05(3). In Pennsylvania, 
“[a] person acts recklessly . . . when he consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that is “of such 
a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of 
the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its 
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Stat. Ann. § 2705. Moral turpitude does not inhere in all 
violations of section 2705, as the least culpable conduct 
criminalized under this statute is merely reckless conduct that 
“may place another person in danger of . . . serious bodily 
injury.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, even an individual who 
drives through a red light on an empty street or speeds down 
an empty thoroughfare could be punished under section 2705 
so long as he or she has a reckless mens rea. Though 
unlawful, such traffic offenses do not always rise to the level 
of “conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary 
to the accepted rules of morality.” See Knapik, 384 F.3d at 89.  
 
 The BIA erroneously relied on Knapik to conclude that 
Mahn’s conviction for reckless endangerment was a CIMT. 
Contrary to the BIA’s claims, the New York reckless 
endangerment statute at issue in Knapik is not analogous to 
Mahn’s statute of conviction. The statute we examined in 
Knapik provides that a “person is guilty of reckless 
endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances 
evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly 
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
another person.” N.Y. Penal Law § 120.25 (emphasis added). 
Applying Chevron deference, we held that the BIA did not 
unreasonably conclude that a conviction under New York 
Penal Law § 120.25 is a CIMT because the statute “contains 
aggravating factors, requiring that a defendant create a ‘grave 
risk of death to another person’ ‘under circumstances 
evincing a depraved indifference to human life.’” Knapik, 384 
F.3d at 90 (quoting § 120.25). In contrast to New York’s 
                                                                                                     
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s 
situation.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 302(b)(3). 
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reckless endangerment statute, Mahn’s statute of conviction 
does not contain the aggravating factors of depraved 
indifference to human life and grave risk of death to another 
person. Moreover, unlike the New York statute, which 
requires reckless conduct that creates a grave risk of 
endangerment, section 2705 only requires conduct that may 
put a person in danger. Such conduct does not necessarily 
implicate moral turpitude. Therefore, we conclude that a 
conviction under section 2705 does not constitute a CIMT.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Because the least culpable conduct punishable under 
section 2705 is not morally turpitudinous, Mahn’s reckless 
endangerment conviction does not qualify as a CIMT. 
Accordingly, we grant Mahn’s petition for review and vacate 
the BIA’s order of removal.  
